Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

State of Utah v. Mark L. Pebley : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dee W. Smith; Randall W. Richards; Weber County Public Defenders Association; Counsel for
Appellant.
Jeanne B. Inouye; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Utah Attorney
General's Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Pebley, No. 20030966 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4667

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
U
A10
_
,_
DOCKET NO.
\jO(fhOnQ>(o-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF, ['APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Ca^No.20030966-CA
MARK L. PEBLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF A P P E L I M

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FjfR POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY,
ENTERED UPON AJ CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA IN THE
SECOND JUDICIAE DISTRICT, WEBER COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE MICHApL D. LYON PRESIDING

DEE W. SMITH
RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Weber County Public Defenders Ass'n
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden,UT 84401
Counsel for Appellant

JEANNETB. INOUYE (1618)
Ass.sfc'ant Attorney General
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
Utah ttorney General's Office
160 last 300 South
X 140854
!iti City, UT 84114-0854
RICHARD PARMLEY
DepTO Weber County Attorney

FILED
Counsel for Aooellee UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 1 k 20M

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20030966-CA
MARK L. PEBLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY,
ENTERED UPON A CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA IN THE
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, WEBER COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON PRESIDING

DEE W. SMITH
RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Weber County Public Defenders Ass'n
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden,UT 84401
Counsel for Appellant

JEANNE B. INOUYE (1618)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
RICHARD PARMLEY
Deputy Weber County Attorney
Counsel for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
T \ R I i- ,.i

ONTENTS.

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE ul iiu : • • , > . ( , < ?
• l M I i >N , \ l , i

vS

<

••

•>

1

•: RFVIPW

L

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...

^

SIAlhMLiNTor lllhl'ACl'S.....

3

SI IMMARY i >! ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS
GARAGE AND HOUSE; OFFICERS EXPLOITED NO PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO
OBTAIN CONSENT

11

A. Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his garage and house

"1

B. Consent was not obtained through the exploitation of a prior illegality

14

1. Police entry onto the curtilage did not constitute an illegal search. Assuming
that officers illegally looked through the garage windows, there was no nexus
or "causal connection" between that illegality and the consent to search and
no exploitation of the illegality to obtain consent
a.

I'nhce entry nnlii Iiu: airtilui.v ilul nol i onsiit:.-

m illesr.tl ^cn'^h

here was no nexus or "causal connection" between the allegedly illegal
window search and defendant's consent.

i

1

5

15
1

0

c. Even if a nexus existed between the alleged window search and
defendant's consent, the connection was sufficiently attenuated so as not
to invalidate the search
2. Defendant's seizure claim is not adequately briefed. In any event, the
driveway exchange did not constitute an illegal search or seizure. Even
assuming that an illegal seizure occurred, consent to search did not result
from exploitation of the illegality

22

26

a. Defendant has not challenged the trial court's determination that the
driveway incident was a level-one consensual encounter, not a seizure.
Defendant's claim that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion is
therefore irrelevant and his exploitation claim is inadequately briefed

26

b. The driveway exchange did not constitute an illegal search or seizure

29

c. Even assuming that an illegal seizure occurred, consent to search did not
result from exploitation of the illegality

33

CONCLUSION

35

NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Florida v.Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)

31

INSv. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)

30

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984)

25, 34

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

32, 33

United States v. Archeval-Vega, 883 F. Supp. 904 (W.D.N. Y. 1994)

31

United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786 (11th Cir. 1985)

20

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)

18

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)

30, 33

United States v. Robinson, 932 F. Supp. 1271 (D.N.M. 1996)

20,21

United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 2000)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

22
21,25

STATE CASES
Cornelius v. Superior Court of Kern County, 102 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal. App. 1972)

20

Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 1AA P.2d 301 (Utah App. 1987)

27

Moonv.Moon, 1999 UT App 12, 973 P.2d431

24

Roderickv. tfzcfe, 2002 UT 84, 54 P.3d 1119

27

Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379, 80 P.3d 546

27

State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073

11, 13, 14

State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,

P.3d

19
2,32

State v. Corbett, 516 P.2d 487 (Or. App. 1973)
iii

15, 16

State v. Crawford, 786 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio App. 2003)

31

State v. Doyle, 63 P.3d 1253 (Or. App. 2003)

20

State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, 92 P.3d 167

22

State v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709 (Utah 1981)

16

State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650

passim

State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137

32

State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981)

16

State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1996)

30

State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998)

26

State v. Fetefo,2000UT62,6P.3dll33

1

State v. West, 459 S.E.2d 55 (N.C. App. 1995)
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d (Utah 1993)

31
11, 22, 23, 25

FEDERAL STATUTES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV

2
STATE STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (West 2004)

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (West 2004)

18

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004)

1

Utah R. App. P. 24

26

OTHER WORKS CITED
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d edition 1996)
Merriam Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2000)

iv

15, 20, 32
15

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff7Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.20030966-CA

MARK L. PEBLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a) (West 2004),
entered upon a conditional guilty plea in the Second Judicial District, Weber County, the
Honorable Michael D. Lyon presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue. Although police may have acted illegally when they looked through
defendant's garage windows, was the subsequent search lawful, where defendant gave
consent and where no nexus existed between any police illegality and the consent?
Standard of Review. The appellate court "review[s] the factual findings
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using
a clearly erroneous standard." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 8, 6 P.3d 1133, 1135

(quotations and citations omitted). The court "review[s] the trial court's conclusions of
law based on these findings for correctness." Id. The Court reviews the application of
the law to the facts non-deferentially. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,f 15,

P.3d

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES
The following constitutional provision is relevant to this appeal:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8( 1 )(a)(iii) (West 2004). R. 1-4. Defendant moved to suppress evidence found
in a search of his home and garage. R. 19-25. Following an evidentiary hearing and
argument on the matter, the trial court denied the motion. R. 45-48, 109 (transcript of
ruling on motion to suppress), 110 (transcript of motion to suppress).
Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(l)(a), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. R. 57,
59, 62-67, 111 (transcript of plea hearing). The trial court sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years. R. 68. Defendant timely appealed.
R. 84.
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 2, 2002, Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) officer Blake
Woodring and a colleague "received information from a confidential informant that []
defendant was operating a methamphetamine laboratory in his garage behind his house,
and if they were to go there promptly, they would catch him cooking meth in his garage
in violation of his probation." R. 109:2. In fact, defendant's probation, apparently in
connection with an earlier narcotics-related conviction, had terminated about ten days
earlier. R. 110:45 (parole officer's testimony); cf. id. at 10 (police officer's testimony).
The probation officers therefore asked Ogden City police officer Jeff Machielson,
an agent for the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force, and a county deputy to
accompany them to defendant's home. Id.; see also R. 110:22. The officers, expecting to
find defendant in his open garage, drove to his residence to conduct an investigation. R.
109:5.
Upon arrival, the officers found the home partially enclosed by a chain link fence,
but open to permit access through the driveway. R. 109:5. A "no trespassing" sign was
posted on the property, that, while plainly visible, was not large or conspicuous.1 Id. at 3,
5. The officers testified that they did not see it. R. 109:3; 110:15. The garage was
located behind the home and visible from the street. R. 109:2-3; 110:16. Both the garage
door, which provided access for vehicles, and a side "man door" (the service door),

The former occupant of the premises had posted this sign sometime before he
sold the property to defendant. R. 110:4-6.
3

which provided access for people on foot, were visible from the street. R. 110:13, 16;
Defense Exhibit 2 (diagram). The officers could see from the street that the garage's
vehicle door was closed. R: 110:16-17.
The entry. Having been told by the confidential informant that defendant was at
that very moment in the garage, Machielson and Woodring did not initially approach the
front door of the home, but walked through the open driveway entrance and down the
driveway that led to the garage. R. 110:16-18, 46. The other officers, one a county
deputy and the other an AP&P agent, remained at the top of the driveway. Id. at 22.
Woodring testified, "We walked down the driveway to where the garage was
because that's where we anticipated he was going to be based on the information we had
received." Id. at 46. Machielson gave additional reasons for the attempt to contact
defendant at the garage. He testified that he normally contacts suspects by knocking on
the front door. Id. at 17. He explained, however, that he responded differently in this
case because he had been given information that the suspect was currently operating a
methamphetamine laboratory in the garage. Id. at 18. He stated that he did not go to the
front door of the home because he did not want someone in the garage to flee ("if
somebody was in the garage at that time and you went to the front door, they may not still
be in the garage") and for safety reasons (he didn't want "to knock on the front door and
have somebody run out the back" and "an operating methamphetamine lab . .. ha[s]
chemical exposure, fire,. . . suspects [who] could possibly be armed"). Id. at 20.
Machielson and Woodring approached the closed garage, but could hear no
activity inside. Id. at 18. While it appeared that no one was there, they walked to the
4

garage's service door and knocked twice to see if they could get a response. Id, at 21.
They did not. Id. Asked if the garage had any windows, Machielson testified that there
was a window next to the service door. Id. Asked whether he looked into the window,
he stated, "I glanced past it and you can't really see anything in it." Asked the same
questions, Woodring stated that he could not remember looking in the garage window,
but "[i]t seem[ed] like we probably would have looked in if there w[ere] windows there
to try and get someone's attention because we believed he was back there." Id. at 49.
The encounter with defendant. Finding no one in the garage, the officers began
walking back toward the front door, hoping to contact defendant in his home. Id. At that
moment, defendant pulled into the driveway. Id. The four officers approached
defendant's truck. Id. at 23. Machielson unholstered his weapon and "held it at his side."
R. 109:3; 110:24,31. Machielson asked defendant to get out of the truck. R. 110:31.
When defendant stepped out without a weapon in his hand, Machielson reholstered his
weapon. R. 109:3; 110:24, 31. Machielson then asked permission to conduct a "patdown," and defendant agreed. R. 110:24. Defendant put his hands on the bed of the
truck, and Machielson patted him down for weapons. Id. Machielson found none. Id.
Machielson spoke briefly with defendant, telling defendant that he had received "a
report that [defendant] was cooking dope in his garage." Id. at 24-25. Defendant said
that he was not. Id. at 25. This conversation lasted about five to ten minutes and was
cordial. R. 109:3.
The consent to search. Machielson then asked defendant if the officers could go
into the garage to make certain there was no lab there. R. 110:25-26. Machielson and the
5

other officers made no promises or threats or other show offeree. R. 109:3, 110:26.
Defendant gave his permission. R. 109:3; 110:25. He indicated that the garage was
locked, explained that the keys were in his vehicle, and allowed Machielson to retrieve
the keys from the truck ignition. R. 110:25. Before entering the garage, Machielson
asked defendant whether there were any chemicals or other hazardous materials in the
garage. Id. Defendant said there were not. Id. Defendant then volunteered that "there
[was] some dope in the desk drawer inside." Id.
The officers found a bag of methamphetamine in the drawer. Id. at 27. The
officers then asked for permission to search the house, and defendant gave permission.
R. 109:4; 110:27-28. Again, the officers made no threats or promises. R. 110:28. This
search produced a glass pipe used for ingesting methamphetamine. R. 109:4, 110:27.
The motion to suppress and evidentiary hearing. Following the preliminary
hearing, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from his home and
garage. R. 19. He claimed that the officers unlawfully entered the curtilage of his
property and unlawfully searched his garage in his absence. R. 21-22. The officers
"trespassed on his property, and unlawfully looked into the windows of his garage."
R. 23 As a consequence, he argued, "all of their perceptions, from any of their senses,
must be suppressed." R. 22.
He also claimed that his consent to the search of his garage was involuntary. He
alleged that when he "came home and caught the [officers] in their unlawful behavior,
they confronted him with their unsupported allegations and told him that if [he] didn't let
them search, he would be going to jail." R. 23. He argued that this was a "coercive set of
6

circumstances." R. 24. He further claimed that his consent, even if voluntary, was a
result of "the officers' unlawful behavior." Id. For these reasons, he claimed that
evidence seized in the subsequent search of his garage and home was illegally obtained
and should be suppressed. R. 25
At the evidentiary hearing, defendant further asserted that the officers' purpose for
entering onto his property was to catch him operating a methamphetamine lab.
R. 110:69-70. He also claimed that the allegedly illegal entry and unlawful garage
window observations, together with Machielson's unholstering a weapon and conducting
a pat-down, coerced him into giving consent. Id. at 71-72.
The ruling on the motion. Addressing defendant's illegal entry claim, the trial
court found that the officers entered the property to conduct an investigation. R. 109:5.
The court held that the officers acted lawfully when they entered onto the property and
approached the garage door, believing that defendant, the property owner, was in the
garage and not in the house. Id. The court held that Machielson acted unlawfully and in
violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when he peered into the garage
window. Id. The court held, however, that this illegality did not vitiate the defendant's
subsequent consent to search because there was "no legal nexus between looking in the
window and the subsequent consent. The officers used nothing in that illegality to
exploit against the defendant to obtain the consent." Id. at 5-6.
Addressing defendant's conversation with police in the driveway, the court
observed that "the officers conducted a level-one citizen police encounter; namely, one in
which the defendant consents to police questioning." Id. at 5-6. The court found that
7

"[t]he earlier drawn weapon had been holstered and the pat-down was for weapons only.
A calm, cordial conversation occurred after those events." Id. at 6.
The court found that defendant "gave consent to the search of home and garage."
Id. The court also found that "[t]he officers made no claim of improper authority to
search," "exhibited no force at the time of securing consent," and "employed no
deception or trick." Id. "They merely made a request to search and the defendant
cooperated and consented." Id. Looking at the "totality of circumstances," the court
concluded that defendant gave his consent voluntarily. Id.
Finally, the court held that defendant's consent did not result from the exploitation
of any prior police illegality. Id. at 6. The court held that Machielson's looking into the
garage window violated defendant's expectation of privacy. Id. The court found,
however, no evidence "that the defendant even was aware of the police illegality." Id. at
7. The court therefore found that defendant "ha[d] no reason to be concerned when he
voluntarily g[ave] consent." Id. Further the court found that the officers saw nothing and
"used nothing in that illegality to exploit against the defendant to obtain the consent." Id.
at 6-7. Based on these findings, the court concluded that there was "no legal nexus
between looking in the window and the subsequent consent." Id. at 6. "[C]onsent was
not obtained by exploitation of the prior illegality; that is, . . . the connection between the
consent and the prior illegality was sufficiently attenuated that excluding the evidence
would have no deterrent effect." Id. at 7-8.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court properly concluded that defendant voluntarily consented to a
search. While an officer briefly unholstered his weapon as defendant pulled into the
driveway, he reholstered it after defendant exited the truck without a weapon. Defendant
consented to a weapons pat-down, which produced no weapon. Following a five or ten
minute "cordial conversation" defendant consented to a search of his garage and home.
Defendant cooperated with police by volunteering the location of the garage keys and the
location of a bag of methamphetamine in the garage. Defendant's will was not
overborne.
2. Defendant's consent was not obtained by exploitation of a prior illegality.
First, the officers lawfully entered upon the curtilage, and consent to search was therefore
not the result of an illegal entry. The curtilage of a dwelling is only semi-private. Open
access ways, like the driveway, extend an implied invitation for entry by the public.
Police officers violate no expectation of privacy by entering upon an open driveway or
path.
Second, although the officers may have looked into the garage windows
unlawfully, they learned nothing that motivated their request for consent to search.
Further, defendant did not know the officers had looked through the windows. In any
case, no evidence could have been seen through the windows. The officers therefore
could not have exploited the illegality to obtain consent.
Finally, this Court should decline to address defendant's claim that consent to
search resulted from an illegal seizure because it is not adequately briefed. Defendant
9

claims that police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify their seizing him in the driveway.
Defendant, however, has not addressed, let alone challenged the trial court's conclusion
that the driveway incident was a level-one encounter, not a seizure. A level one
encounter does not require reasonable suspicion.
In any case, police conduct was lawful. The trial court correctly determined that
the driveway exchange was a level-one encounter, not a seizure. Even if a seizure
occurred, it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Further, even assuming both that a
seizure occurred and that reasonable suspicion was lacking, the connection between the
illegal seizure and the consent was nevertheless sufficiently attenuated so as not to
invalidate the search.

10

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH
OF HIS GARAGE AND HOUSE; OFFICERS EXPLOITED NO
PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO OBTAIN CONSENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to suppress
evidence found in his garage and house after he consented to a police search. Defendant
claims that his consent to search was not voluntarily given and that police obtained his
consent by exploitation of a prior illegality. Br. Appellant at 17. He claims that the
police illegally entered onto the curtilage of his home, illegally looked through the garage
windows, and illegally seized him. Id. at 12, 14, 21. He relies on these alleged
illegalities to support his exploitation claim.
Consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Bisner,
2001 UT 99, % 43, 37 P.3d 1073. "A consent is valid only if '(1) [t]he consent was given
voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 47, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. Thurman,
846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993)). The trial court properly found that defendant gave
consent voluntarily and that the police did not obtain consent by exploitation of a prior
illegality. R. 109:5, 7-8.
A,

Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his garage and house.
"Before a court addresses whether consent was voluntary, it must first determine

that there was consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f 48. Based on the officers'
uncontroverted, credible testimony that they asked permission to search the garage and
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home and that defendant gave permission, the trial court found that defendant gave
consent. R. 109:6; 110:25, 50. Defendant has not challenged that finding on appeal.
In assessing voluntariness, a court must determine whether "a person's will [has
been] overborne." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at ^f 57. "The appropriate standard to
determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances test, and the burden of proof
is by preponderance of the evidence." Id. at f 56. "The totality of the circumstances
must show consent was given without duress or coercion." Id. at ^| 57.
These factors "may show a lack of duress or coercion": "(1) the absence of a
claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by
the officers; (3) a mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner . . . ; and (5) the
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer." Id. (quotation and citation
omitted).
Applying those factors, the trial court concluded that consent was given without
duress or coercion. As found by the trial court, "[t]he officers made no claim of improper
authority to search," "exhibited no force at the time of securing consent," and "employed
no deception or trick." R. 109:6. "They merely made a request to search and the
defendant cooperated and consented." Id. The trial court ruled correctly.
While the presence of four officers is a factor that might in some circumstances
suggest duress, here the officers' conduct was not threatening. Moreover, while an
officer's use of a weapon might in many circumstances cause duress, here the only use of
a weapon was clearly a precautionary and not a threatening act. Only one officer
unholstered his weapon, and he merely held it to his side as a precaution until defendant
12

exited his vehicle. R. 109:3; 110:24, 31. Once defendant stepped out of his truck and the
officer saw that defendant was unarmed, the officer put it away. Id. Nothing in the
record indicates that defendant saw the weapon during the brief time it was unholstered.
Cf. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, at 149 (concluding that show offeree directed at son as he
exited house did not coerce mother who remained inside).
Under some circumstances, a pat-down might suggest duress. But, in this case,
although an officer patted defendant down for weapons, he did so only after requesting
and receiving permission to do so. R. 110:24. The officer did not indicate or imply that
defendant was required to submit to the pat-down. Id.
Finally, a "cordial conversation" lasting about ten minutes intervened between the
pat-down and the request to search. R. 109:3-4. As defendant conceded in his brief, the
officers "assumed a less intimidating posture, [as they] questioned [him] about his drug
use and the 'tip' that he was manufacturing methamphetamine." Br. Appellant at 15.
When asked for permission to search, defendant not only consented, but cooperated,
volunteering both the location of the key required to open the garage and the location of
the methamphetamine in a drawer inside the garage. R. 109:3-4, 110:25. See Hansen,
2002 UT 125, at \ 58 (concluding that defendant, who had been illegally detained,
voluntarily consented to search, and observing that (1) officer asked permission, used no
threat, and employed no deception and (2) defendant cooperated in the search).
Applying a "totality of circumstances" test, the trial court properly concluded that
defendant gave his consent voluntarily. R. 109:6. Factors showing the "lack of duress"
included (1) "the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers," (2) "the
13

absence of an exhibition offeree by the officers" at the time they requested permission,
(3) "a mere request to search," (4) "cooperation by the owner" in volunteering
information, and (5) "the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer[s]."
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at % 57.
B.

Consent was not obtained through the exploitation of a prior illegality.
Consent obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality, even if voluntarily

given, is not valid. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 61. "Whether a person's consent was
obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is ultimately a legal conclusion
reviewed for correctness." Id.
The threshold inquiry of any exploitation claim is whether police acted unlawfully.
Where police have acted lawfully, exploitation of a prior illegality cannot occur. See
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, at ^f 53. If an illegality has occurred, the court must determine
"[w]hether a person's consent was obtained by police exploitation of [the] prior
illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 61. The court "'evaluates the relationship between
official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if excluding the
evidence will effectively deter future illegalities.'" Id. at % 62 (quoting State v.
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995)).

14

1.

Police entry onto the curtilage did not constitute an illegal search. Assuming
that officers illegally looked through the garage windows, there was no nexus
or "causal connection" between that illegality and the consent to search and
no exploitation of the illegality to obtain consent.

a.

Police entry onto the curtilage did not constitute an illegal search.
Defendant argues that the officers acted illegally when they entered onto his

property, walked down the driveway, and knocked on the garage doors. Br. Appellant at
10, 12-14. Defendant claims that these acts constituted an unreasonable search of the
"curtilage" surrounding his home. Id. Defendant's claim fails because a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the curtilage does not extend to objects in plain view from the
access ways within the curtilage.
Certain lands adjacent to a dwelling may be included in its curtilage, i.e., within
the yard or other property included in the fence surrounding the dwelling. See MerriamWebster 's Unabridged Dictionary (2000). But entry upon the curtilage does not
necessarily constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. Some portions of the curtilage are
only semi-private. See Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 505 (3d
edition 1996) & cases cited therein. "People commonly have different expectations,
whether considered or not, for the access areas of their premises than they do for more
secluded areas." State v. Corbett, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (Or. App. 1973). "[W]hen the
police come on to private property to conduct an investigation or for some other
legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go
(e.g., walkways, driveways, porches), observations made from such vantage points are
not covered by the Fourth Amendment." LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at

15

506-08. For instance, one might expect "various members of the public to enter upon [] a
driveway, e.g., brush salesmen, newspaper boys, postmen, Girl Scout cookie sellers,
distressed motorists, neighbors, friends." Corbett, 516 P.2d at 490. Any of them could
"be reasonably expected to report observations of criminal activity to the police.55 Id. "If
one has a reasonable expectation that various members of society may enter the property
in their personal or business pursuits, he should find it equally likely that the police will
do so.55 Id.
"For an officer to look at what is in open view from a position lawfully accessible
to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a reasonable expectancy of privacy.55 State
v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981); see also State v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709, 711
(Utah 1981) (plurality opinion) (observing that expectation of privacy does not extend to
objects in plain view from access ways within the curtilage, as they "offer[] an implied
permission to the public to enter5' and holding that owner/occupant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in marijuana plants observable from driveway leading to the
house).
Here, the officers entered onto the curtilage via a driveway that was lawfully
accessible to the public. The driveway, which was not obstructed by fencing, led to the
garage's main vehicle door. R. 110:13-14; Defense Exhibits 1-5 (pictures and diagram of
property). The officers, in approaching the main garage door, violated no reasonable
expectation of privacy in walking upon an access way that a neighbor, believing
defendant to be in his garage and wanting to borrow a lawn or garden tool, might have
used.
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Further, the officers violated no reasonable expectation of privacy when, upon
receiving no response to their knock on the vehicle door, they followed the cement path
around the corner to the service door and knocked on it, further attempting to contact
defendant. R. 110:18, 48; Defense Exhibit 4. Again, the officers were on an access way
that a neighbor might have used to contact defendant. While the officers came onto
private property to conduct their investigation, they "restricted] their movements to
places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches),'5 and any
"observations [they might have] made from such vantage points are not covered by the
Fourth Amendment." LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 506-08.
Moreover, the officers had a legitimate purpose for being on the access way.
Defendant alleges that they entered "for the sole purpose of searching therein." Br.
Appellant at 14. As the trial court found, however, the officers did not enter the driveway
to conduct a search, but to contact defendant in the course of an investigation. R. 109:5.
While the purpose of the investigation was to determine whether defendant was operating
a methamphetamine laboratory and while the officers may have expected to catch
defendant making methamphetamine, nothing suggested that the officers intended to
conduct an illegal search. R. 109:5; 110:10,45-46,48.
Defendant also argues that "the police officers were trespassers," which, in
addition to their entry onto the curtilage of his property, violated his "expectation of
privacy." Br. Appellant at 14. The trial court properly ruled that the presence of the "no
trespassing" sign had limited significance. The court stated, "[T]he prohibition against
trespassing is not absolute under the law. It only precludes nonlegal business or casual
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visitors." R. 109:5. The court concluded that the police officers "ha[d] a qualified
privilege to enter on the premises to conduct a police investigation by asking questions."
Id.
These conclusions are consistent with Utah law. The relevant statutory provisions
defining the elements of criminal trespass and the defenses to prosecution are these:
(2)
(a)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(b)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

(4)
(a)
(b)

A person is guilty of criminal trespass if,...
he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of
another; [or]
knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on
property as to which notice against entering is given by:
personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner;
fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders;
or
posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders;
It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the:
property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained;
and
actor rs conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner rs use of
the property.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2) & (4) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
Nothing in the record suggests that the police knew or should have known that
their presence could be unlawful, defendant's driveway was open to the public, and the
police did not interfere with defendant's use of the property.
Even assuming that the officers had trespassed, the trespass would not, of itself,
demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation. In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
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712-13 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed the significance of a trespass: "The
existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the
Fourth Amendment has been violated,... for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 [parallel citations] (1967) (no trespass, but Fourth Amendment violation) with Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 [parallel citations](1984) (trespass, but no Fourth
Amendment violation).55
In sum, the police entry upon the curtilage was lawful. It violated no reasonable
expectation of privacy. Because police acted lawfully, they committed no illegality and
therefore could not have exploited such an illegality.
b.

There was no nexus or "causal connection" between the allegedly illegal
window search and defendant's consent.
Defendant also claims, and the trial court found, that the investigating officers

conducted an illegal search when they looked through the garage windows. Br.
Appellant at 10; R. 109:5-6. But even assuming the window observations constituted an
illegal search, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because the police

2

Without any analysis, defendant argues that under the Utah Constitution "a
police officer that trespasses onto private property has no authority at all to stop any
person, let alone a 'right of investigation.55' Br. Appellant at 16. This Court should
decline to address defendant's state constitutional claim because it was not argued below
and is inadequately briefed on appeal. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah
App. 1990).
3

If the officers left the access ways to look through the windows, they may have
violated defendant's expectation of privacy. The officers did not testify that they left the
access ways to look through the windows. Defense Exhibit 4, a picture of the garage,
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did not exploit that illegality to obtain defendant's consent to search. R. 109:4. The trial
court correctly concluded there was no connection between the officers' window
observations and defendant's subsequent consent to their search of his garage and home.
R. 109:6.
"[T]he mere fact of an unauthorized or illegal search does not, ipso facto, make
evidence obtained in a subsequent search of the same premises . . . the fruit of the prior
illegal search." Cornelius v. Superior Court of Kern County, 102 Cal.Rptr. 59, 63 (Cal.
App. 1972). Rather, "[t]here must be a nexus, clearly perceivable, between the first
search and evidence seized in the second search." Id. Absent a causal connection, a
defendant's "consent [could not have been] obtained by police exploitation of [the] prior
illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 62; see also United States v. Robinson, 932 F.
Supp 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 1996).
Where officers conduct a search pursuant to consent, the consensual search is
permissible unless some nexus exists between a prior illegality and the consent. For
instance, a nexus may exist where a prior illegal search gave the police a reason to seek
consent. See State v. Doyle, 63 P.3d 1253, 1257 (Or. App. 2003). A nexus may exist
where a prior illegal search caused the defendant to give consent. See United States v.
Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 793 (11 th Cir. 1985); LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 8.2(d),
at 663 & n. 125. But where the prior illegal search gave officers no reason to seek

however, shows the windows located at some distance from the service door. See
Defense Exhibit 4, photograph H, inside manila envelope included in record.
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consent and where it did not affect a defendant's decision to give consent, no nexus exists
between the prior illegality and the evidence discovered in a subsequent consent search.
In other words, determining whether evidence is fruit of a Fourth Amendment
violation presupposes that there is a "causal connection" between the evidence and the
illegality See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (noting that the
exclusionary rule bars evidence "come at by exploitation of [the] illegality"). "Where
there is no causal connection in the first instance, [exploitation] analysis is inapposite."
Robinson, 932 F. Supp at 1278 .
In this case, assuming that the police conducted an illegal search when they looked
through the garage windows, that search had no connection to defendant's later consent
to the subsequent garage and house search. The search, if illegal, was not the reason for
the officers' presence on the property when defendant returned. They came onto
defendant's property to locate defendant as part of an investigation, and they were still
attempting to find defendant when he drove up. R. 109:5. As found by the trial court,
police saw no incriminating evidence when they looked into the garage window and,
indeed, no incriminating evidence could have been seen. R. 109:6-7; 110:25. The police
did not obtain or use any evidence from the search or the fact of the search itself to
extract consent. R. 109:5-6. Defendant, in fact, was unaware of the search and would
have had no reason for concern even if he had been aware. R. 109:7-8.
Thus, there was no "nexus" between the window search and defendant's consent.
Absent a causal connection, defendant's "consent [could not have been] obtained by
police exploitation of [the] prior illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at ^ 61.
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c.

Even if a nexus existed between the alleged window search and defendant's
consent, the connection was sufficiently attenuated so as not to invalidate the
search.
Even where some connection exists between a prior illegality and a person's

consent, consent is not obtained by exploitation of that illegality and a consent search is
not invalid where "the connection between the prior illegality and [the] consent [is]
sufficiently attenuated." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273. When police obtain evidence
pursuant to a voluntary "consent to search that follows on the heels of a Fourth
Amendment violation," the Court must determine whether that consent "was independent
of the violation to such a degree as to cause a 'break in the chain of events sufficient to
refute the inference that the evidence was the product of the constitutional violation.'"
State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, \ 23 n.8, 92 P.3d 167 (quoting United States v. Vega,
221 F.3d 789, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (brackets in Earl omitted). In making that
determination the Court considers three factors: "(1) the purpose and flagrancy of the
illegal conduct, (2) the presence or intervening circumstances, and (3) the temporal
proximity between the illegal [conduct] and consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, atfflf64-69
(citing Brown v. Illinois, All U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)) (quotation omitted). "Where the
[police] misconduct is extreme, [the Court] require[s] a clean break in the chain of events
between the misconduct and the consent to find the consent valid." Thurman, 846 P.2d at
1264. On the other hand, "where it appears that the illegality arose as the result of
negligence, the lapse of time between the misconduct and the consent and the presence of
intervening events become less critical to the dissipation of the taint." Id.
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A review of the facts of this case in light of these three factors supports the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress.
Purpose andflagrancy of the illegal conduct Where the purpose of the illegal
conduct is to obtain consent, suppressing the evidence derived from that conduct will
"'clearly have a deterrent effect.'" Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 65 (quoting Thurman, 846
P.2d at 1264). Here, however, the officers did not look into the garage windows for the
purpose of discovering evidence they could use to obtain consent. Rather, they merely
looked in the window to try to locate defendant as part of their attempt to conduct an
investigation. R. 110:21, 49 ("It seems like we probably would have looked in if there
[were] windows there to try and get someone's attention because we believed [defendant]
was back there."). Therefore, any police conduct was not extreme.
Intervening circumstances. Moreover, significant circumstances had intervened
between the officers' window observations and the consent. The officers, who had
learned nothing by looking in the windows, had left the garage and were on the driveway
at the side of the house when defendant pulled up. R. 109:3, 110:22, 49. Because they
had left the garage area, defendant did not know that they had looked into the garage.
R. 109:7. These intervening circumstances purged any taint of a prior illegal search. Had
defendant been aware of the prior search and had he believed that the police already had
incriminating evidence, he may have felt that he no longer had a reason to withhold
consent, and his consent may have been the fruit of an illegal search. That, however, was
not case.
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While defendant now suggests that he was aware of the officers' search, the
evidentiary hearing produced no testimony to support that assertion.4 See Br. Appellant
at 7, 15. As found by the trial court, the officers were in the driveway when defendant
returned and "there was no evidence that the defendant even was aware of the police
illegality." R. 109:7. In addition, "there [wa]s no evidence that any evidence seized
could have been seen . . . by looking in the window, so the defendant ha[d] no reason to
be concerned when he voluntarily g[ave] consent." Id. In other words, defendant, who
knew what was in the garage, would have had no reason to worry even if he had known
that the officers had looked through the windows.5 Finally, as found by the court, the
police learned nothing during the window observations and used nothing from the
window observations to obtain consent.6 R. 109:5-6. The officers, in fact, possessed all
the information that motivated their request for consent before they entered onto
defendant's property.

Defendant could have presented evidence at the suppression hearing without
waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Hansen, 2002 UT 125
at \ 50 (noting the "significance" of defendant's failure to testify at the suppression
hearing and consequent failure to rebut the officer's testimony that defendant consented
to the search).
5

Police later obtained defendant's consent to search the garage. R. 109:3; 110:25.
The only contraband discovered was inside a desk drawer. R. 110:27. Defendant knew
that methamphetamine, while present in the garage, was in the drawer and not visible
through the garage windows. R. 110:25.
6

Defendant has not challenged these trial court's findings. Further, he has made
no attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then show why the
findings are clearly erroneous. When an appellant fails to meet the "heavy burden" of
marshaling the evidence, the appellate court will assume that the record supports the
findings of the trial court. Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431.
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Temporal proximity. "A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation
and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not
had time to dissipate." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at If 69 (quotation omitted). The time
lapse is, however, "less critical to the dissipation of taint" where police misconduct is not
extreme. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264.
As explained in the foregoing analysis, police conduct here was not extreme.
Moreover, the time lapse was sufficient to provide a window during which police officers
left the garage area, defendant returned home, and the officers and defendant conversed
cordially for five to ten minutes. This is not a case where "the lapse of time was
negligible." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 69 (suppressing evidence where officers asked
consent "[d]irectly after" illegally detaining a defendant).
Based on these facts, the trial court properly found that the "evidence 'was [not]
come at by exploitation of [the window observations] illegality,'" but by "'means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'" Segura v. United States,
468 U.S. 796, 804-805 (1984) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). The connection
between the illegality and the evidence obtained was "sufficiently attenuated so as not to
invalidate the search." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273. Therefore, the "deterrent effect of
suppressing evidence obtained" would not "justif[y] its cost." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at ^
70. The evidence obtained pursuant to the consent search was not "fruit of the poisonous
tree," and the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
488 (1963).
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2.

Defendant's seizure claim is not adequately briefed. In any event, the
driveway exchange did not constitute an illegal search or seizure. Even
assuming that an illegal seizure occurred, consent to search did not result
from exploitation of the illegality.
Defendant next claims that consent to search the garage and home was obtained by

exploitation of a prior illegal seizure. Br. Appellant at 18. He asserts that he was seized
when Officer Machielson ordered him from his vehicle and forced a pat-down search. Id.
at 15. Defendant argues that the seizure was unreasonable because officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure. Id. at 14, 17.
a.

Defendant has not challenged the trial court's determination that the
driveway incident was a level-one consensual encounter, not a seizure.
Defendant's claim that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion is therefore
irrelevant and his exploitation claim is inadequately briefed
Defendant's claim that the officers lack reasonable suspicion to speak with him in

the driveway presupposes a seizure. The trial court concluded that the driveway incident
was "a level-one citizen police encounter/' not a seizure. R. 109:5-6. Defendant has not
challenged that determination.
Inadequate briefing. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
1998). Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that the argument in the
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect
to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record
relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The rule "requires not just bald citation to authority
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority. [The]
court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument
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and research:' Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379, f 20, 80 P.3d 546
(citing Thomas, 962 P.2d at 305) (emphasis in Spencer) (ellipsis omitted).
Defendant has not challenged the trial court's determination that the driveway
incident was a level-one consensual encounter, not a seizure. R. 109:5-6. A consensual
encounter does not require reasonable suspicion. Defendant's claim that the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion is therefore irrelevant; and his exploitation claim, which is
predicated upon an unreasonable and illegal driveway seizure, is inadequately briefed.
This Court should therefore decline to address it.
Failure to marshal and allegation of unsupportedfacts. Moreover, by positing
his own version of the facts relevant to the driveway incident, defendant has challenged
the trial court's factual findings without complying with the marshaling requirement.
'To comply with the marshaling requirement, appellants must marshal all the favorable
evidence at the point at which they challenge the factual finding," that is, in the argument
section at the point addressing the issue. See Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84,147 n.l 1,
54 P.3d 1119 (emphasis in original) (citing Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304
(Utah App. 1987)).
In making his argument, defendant does not cite to the record. Rather, he asserts
without citation the following version of the facts:
The officers went into [defendant's] backyard specifically to see if
they could 'catch' him manufacturing methamphetamine in his garage. The
peered through the window of his garage and seeing nothing incriminating
started to leave. As they did, [defendant] arrived home. Noting that the
officers were in his backyard, [defendant] stayed in his automobile as the
officers approached him.
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When three officers arrived at [his] car, one of them drew his
weapon, keeping it pointed at the ground. The other two ordered [him]
from his vehicle and 'spread him out' on the hood of the car. They then
conducted a search of [his] person without his consent. The reason given
for this was that the officers knew that [he] had recently cleared parole.
After searching [him] and finding no weapons, the officers assumed a less
intimidating posture, but questioned [him] about his drug use and the 'tip'
that he was manufacturing methamphetamine.
Br. Appellant at 15.
This version of the facts is neither consistent with the trial court's findings nor
supported by the record. As found by the trial court, the officers had left the garage,
which was located behind the house, and were "walk[ing] down the driveway . . . along
the side of the house" when "defendant drove up in his vehicle." R. 109:3. As defendant
pulled into the driveway, one officer did, as a precaution, unholster his weapon and hold
it at his side. Id. The officer reholstered the weapon before he asked to perform the
pat-down. R. 109:3; 110:24, 31. Moreover, the officer did not order defendant from his
vehicle or "spread him out" on the hood of his car or search him without his consent.
The State has located only one record entry on the question of whether defendant
was ordered out of his vehicle. Officer Machielson, who testified that he briefly
unholstered his weapon and kept it at his side, testified that he "asked [defendant] to get
out of the vehicle." R. 110:31. Thus, he testified to a request, not an order. Further, the
officer immediately reholstered the weapon when defendant exited the vehicle without a
weapon in his hand. R. 109:3; 110:24, 31. Nothing in the record suggests that defendant
ever saw the weapon while it was unholstered.
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Further, the officers did not search or pat-down defendant without his consent. As
the trial court found, "After the defendant exited his [truck] without a weapon in his
hand, the officer holstered his weapon." R. 109:3. "The officers briefly explained their
purpose and asked permission to pat the defendant for a concealed weapon." Id. That
finding is not clearly erroneous. Moreover, Officer Machielson gave uncontroverted
testimony that defendant, in fact, gave consent. R. 110:24. Defendant's assertion that the
officers patted him down without his consent is inconsistent with the trial court's findings
and inconsistent with the uncontroverted testimony given at the suppression hearing. See
R. 109:5-6, R. 110:24.
Finally, defendant mischaracterizes the officers' conduct during the pat-down.
Defendant was not "'spread . . . out' on the hood of the car." Br. Appellant at 15.
Rather, the officer had defendant place his hands on the bed of his truck during the patdown. R. 110:24.
Thus, defendant's failure to adequately analyze the facts of this case in light of the
law is compounded by his failure to marshal the facts relevant to his claim and by his
allegation of facts inconsistent with the trial court's findings and unsupported in the
record. This Court should therefore decline to address his claim.
b.

The driveway exchange did not constitute an illegal search or seizure.
In any event, defendant's claim fails on the merits. Br. Appellant at 14-17. The

driveway exchange was lawful. The incident was a level one consensual encounter, not a
seizure. Moreover, even if a seizure occurred, it was supported by reasonable suspicion.
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Consensual encounter. "A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement
official is a consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive
questioning by an officer." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 34. "Since the encounter is
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
In contrast, "[a] level two encounter involves an investigative detention that is
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive." Id. at ^f 35. The United States Supreme
Court has explained that "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave." United
States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
Seizure is marked by police use "of physical force or a show of authority" such
that the person's "freedom of movement is restrained." Id. at 553. "Examples of
circumstances that might indicate a seizure . . . would be the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person . . . , or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App.
1996) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
But "police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment
violation. While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so,
and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the
consensual nature of the response." INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). "Unless
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the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable
person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot
say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
A reasonable person in defendant's position would have believed that he was "free
to disregard the police and go about his business." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434
(1991) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the officers met defendant in his driveway,
asked his permission to conduct a pat-down search, and conducted the search. R. 109:310. Defendant agreed to a pat-down search which produced no weapon. Id. Following
the pat-down, a cordial conversation ensued. Id. This conduct would not have suggested
to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave.
While an officer had briefly unholstered his weapon when defendant drove into
the driveway, he reholstered it immediately when defendant exited his vehicle unarmed.
R. 110:24. Nothing suggests that defendant saw the weapon. Further, an officer's
request to conduct a pat-down does not constitute a seizure and does not communicate
that a defendant is not free to leave. See United States v. Archeval-Vega, 883 F. Supp
904, 910 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that request to conduct a pat-down search "was
not so coercive as to communicate to the Defendant that he was not free to leave"); State
v. West, 459 S.E.2d 55, 58 (N.C. App. 1995) (stating that "questioning and request to
frisk do not constitute a seizure"); State v. Crawford, 786 N.E.2d 83, 85-86 (Ohio App.
2003) (holding that request to perform a pat-down did not constitute a seizure).
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Under these circumstances, a reasonable person may have felt the normal
inclination to cooperate with police, but he would nevertheless have believed that he was
free to go about his business. Thus, no seizure occurred.
Reasonable suspicion. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant was seized, the
seizure was reasonable and therefore legal. Where officers have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous, officers may conduct a weapons search.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1968). When an officer is investigating a minor
crime, "there must be particular facts which lead the officer to believe that a suspect is
armed." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 32,

P.3d

(quoting State v. Warren, 2001

UT App 346, \ 15, 37 P.3d 270) (internal quotation omitted) (in turn citing LaFave, 4
Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 255-56). However, where the underlying nature of the
crime is itself sufficient to "trigger the officer's reasonable suspicion" that a suspect may
be armed, the officer may frisk the suspect without additional evidence that the suspect is
armed. Brake, 2004 UT 95 at If 32. Operating a methamphetamine laboratory is such a
crime. See State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997) (noting that "officer
could reasonably assume individuals suspected of participating in moving large quantities
of illegal drugs . . . may be armed") (citing State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring)); LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 256
(including as sufficient underlying crimes "robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons,
homicide, and dealing in large quantities of narcotics") (emphasis added); R. 110:20
(officer testifying that "operating a meth lab" presents circumstances where "suspects
could possibly be armed").
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Therefore, even assuming that defendant was seized when officers conducted the
weapons pat-down, the seizure was reasonable and legal. Thus, it was not a prior
illegality, and defendant's subsequent consent to search could not have been the fruit of
such a prior illegality.
c.

Even assuming that an illegal seizure occurred, consent to search did not
result from exploitation of the illegality.
Even assuming that the pat-down constituted an unlawful seizure, defendant's

consent was not the result of that illegality. "[A] person is 'seized' only when, by means
of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained."
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553; accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. A seizure may "deescalate to a consensual encounter. Since a consensual encounter is not a seizure,
questioning during such an encounter is lawful, regardless of scope, as long as the person
remains a willing participant." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 27. A seizure "de-escalates to
a consensual encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of
the circumstances, that he or she is free to end the encounter and depart." Id. at \ 39.
Here, following the pat-down search, the officers and defendant engaged in a
cordial conversation in which the officers conveyed the purpose for their investigation
and defendant responded that the tip was inaccurate. R. 109:3. Following that five-toten-minute conversation, officers asked defendant for permission to search his garage.
Id. Defendant not only consented, but also volunteered information about where to locate
the garage key and where to look for drugs inside the garage. R. 109:3-4; 110:25.
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Defendant was no longer seized when he gave consent. Moreover, even if
defendant had been illegally seized during the pat-down, the seizure was not a flagrant
illegality. The officers did not seize him to force his consent, but to insure their own
safety. R. 110:20, 31. Police learned nothing while conducting the pat-down that led
them to request permission to search. Therefore, suppressing the evidence obtained
pursuant to defendant's consent, simply because the police took precautions to protect
themselves, would not have a deterrent effect on future illegal behavior.
Moreover, police officers did not seek consent to search immediately upon
completion of the pat-down. Rather, a cordial conversation lasting five to ten minutes
intervened between the pat-down and the request to search. R. 109:3; 110:24-25. Under
these circumstances, defendant did not assent to the search because of any duress or
coercion he may have felt during the pat-down. The cordial conversation that intervened
between the pat-down and the request to search dissipated any atmosphere offeree and
coercion, and defendant had time to decide whether he wanted to cooperate with police or
not.
In sum, consent was not "'come at by exploitation of [any prior] illegality," but
"by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of [any] primary taint." Segura, 468
U.S. at 804-05 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). The trial court therefore properly
concluded that "suppressing the evidence obtained" would not "justif[y] its cost."
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f 70.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. Defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this JH day of

, 2004.

J^LCJJ^^

MARK L. SHURTLEF
Attorney General

r

JEANNEB.INOUYE
ssistant Attorney General
ttorneys for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the J1/ day of <r^jUjJhs

, 2004, I either mailed first-

class postage prepaid or hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to
appellant's counsel of record, as follows:
DEE W. SMITH
RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Weber County Public Defenders Ass'n
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401
Counsel for Appellant
4WiA

TVT?
E B. fisjrn
INOUYE

35

/

'

5

